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Abstract
Background: Understanding the health policy formulation process over the years has focused on the content of
policy to the neglect of context. This had led to several policy initiatives having a still birth or ineffective policy
choices with sub-optimal outcomes when implemented. Sometimes, the difficulty has been finding congruence
between different values and interests of the various stakeholders. How can policy initiators leverage the various
subtle mechanisms that various players draw on to leverage their interests during policy formulation. This paper
attempts to conceptualise these levers of policy formulation to enhance an understanding of this field of work
based on lived experience.
Methodology: This is a qualitative participant observation case study based on retrospective recollection of the
policy process and political levers involved in developing the Ghana National Health Insurance Scheme. The study
uses a four-concept framework which is agenda setting, symbols manipulation, constituency preservation and
coalition building to capture the various issues, negotiations and nuanced approaches used in arriving at desired
outcomes.
Results: Technical experts, civil society, academicians and politicians all had significant influence on setting the
health insurance agenda. Each of these various stakeholders carefully engaged in ways that preserved their
constituency interests through explicit manoeuvres and subtle engagements. Where proposals lend themselves to
various interpretations, stakeholders were quick to latch on the contentious issues to preserve their constituency
and will manipulate the symbols that arise from the proposals to their advantage. Where interests are contested
and the price of losing out will leave government worse off which will favour its political opponent, it will push for
divergent interests outside parliamentary politics through intense negotiations to build coalitions so a particular
policy may pass.
Conclusions: This paper has examined the policy environment and the political leverages in retrospect at arriving
at Ghana’s health insurance policy and design. New perspectives have been brought to the dynamics of the
interactions of the 3 streams of problem, policy and politics. It provides lessons which suggest that in
understanding the policy process, it is important that actors engage with the content as well as the context to
understand viewpoints that may be expressed by interest groups. This will empower policy proponents to achieve
easier results and limit the frustrations associated with the policy process. There are no straight and determined
pathways for achieving outcomes so appreciating the evidence and basis for design, negotiation process and
building coalitions along the way are skills to be mastered.
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It is recognised that implementing universal social
health protection may be one of the critical ways of
achieving the MDGs and universal health coverage. Pro-
viding access to health care, including equitable health
insurance mechanisms, are important contributions to
eradicating poverty and vulnerability. Such mechanisms
address poverty and vulnerability on several levels [1].
The introduction of Social Health Insurance into low to
lower middle income countries has been slow in com-
ing. According to an ILO Social Security Policy briefing
paper on Social Health Protection [2], for many years it
was generally believed that extending social health pro-
tection into developing countries was premature because
such countries are economically immature to deal with
the political and financial burden associated with social
security. The objectives of social health protection policy
relate to the entire population and in developing coun-
tries the financial compromises required are excessively
sub-optimal. The difficulty is that objectives are not
always congruent for different players with different
value interests. This has led to some authors concluding
that public sector policy is inherently political. Social
health insurance policies adoption is no exception.
There are several publications on the technical aspects
of health insurance in countries and its effects on the
financing environment. Various systems of social health
insurance and their premium payment mechanisms exist.
Premiums may be paid at household or individual level.
In his view, using the household as a basis for payment
means that households pay a fixed amount irrespective of
seize and this helps to combat adverse selection. Lewis
[3] examined the technical factors in design and its effect
on institutional management outcomes and observed
that the institutions developed can lead to excessive
bureaucracy, cost escalation and difficulties in premium
management. Ellis and Miller [4] in their analysis suggest
that the introduction of social health insurance in coun-
tries shifted governments from the use of budgets as the
main system of paying for services to either a fee for ser-
vice model (FFS) or a patient-based payment method
(PBP) such as diagnostic-related groups (DRGs). Shifting
from one to adopt the other can lead to complications in
health financing and insurance management and
required technical expertise that may not always be avail-
able to developing countries.
There is very limited literature available on the political
factors influencing choice of design. It is only Agyepong
and Adjei [5] who examined the power dimension that
comes to play between political and technical experts
during the introduction of health insurance in Ghana. It
noted that the power of the politically powerful was used
to sieve out undesirable inputs from technical experts
which do not add to their intended outcome. The
authors observed that “… the stronger position of politi-
cal actors to control and direct the policy process, com-
bined with some political sense of insecurity”” (p 158)
was what determined the policy outcome. Technical
experts and other stakeholder roles were expressed as
passive, placid or something that can be placated. They
were critical of the seeming powerful political elite in
selective engagement and interest mongering with an
almost abrasive militancy. It however did not explain why
particular policy decisions were adopted to arrive at the
existing design. There is also no publication that
unpacked and conceptualised the political leverages that
are drawn on to provide lessons for agencies and institu-
tions seeking to introduce a major public sector reform
such as health insurance.
The focus of this paper is to partially fill this gap by
drawing on a framework of policy analysis to bring
attention to the political levers in Ghana’s health insur-
ance policy development. It adds a new dimension to
the policy and political leverages that influenced realised
policy and contributes to literature both in terms of the
framework of analysis and the political context. The
idea is to draw out lessons that may be applicable widely
in the health policy analysis and development process.
Framework for analysis
There are challenges in doing health policy analysis
because of the complexity involved in the different defini-
tions associated with it [6]. There is conceptual debate
over whether policies emerge or are planned, whether the
issues are observable objectively and whether these mani-
fest in a consistent pattern. As Walt and others [7] noted,
“there are also many other conceptual challenges …
capturing and measuring the levels of resources, values,
beliefs and power of diverse actors is difficult’ (p 310). A
number of authors have recommended that attempts to
understand why a particular policy was adopted should
revolve around factors related to agenda setting, allocating
resources, distribution power and deciding whose needs
come first [8-10].
In the various publications where power resources are
used to explain policy adopted the broader concerns are
usually expressed as affecting interests preserved by or
imposed on specific groups in societies by powerful
elites. Gringle and Thomas’[8] work in developing coun-
tries is one of the most quoted paper in understanding
the role of political actors in influencing policy. The
authors suggested that government and public officers
constitute into an elite group and have a strong influ-
ence on agenda setting and the nature of policy adopted.
The elite actors work together to protect their interest
from the elegy and interest of actors not within the cir-
cle of official positions. This act of preservation is to
protect ideological positions and retain control over the
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cumstance has a particular peculiarity which generally
arises out of the environment context, particularly in
circumstances of crises and reform.
Thomas and Gilson [11] others based on experiences
from South Africa and Zambia observed strong influence
of in-country political factors and actors over which health
care financing policies were implemented, which should
not and what the details of policy design should be. Promi-
nent among these are ministers of health and finance,
parliamentarians, academic analysts and trade unions.
They noted that technical experts and analysts, working
either inside or outside government, had varying and often
limited influence on the type of policy to be adopted. In
part, this reflected the limits in the technical understand-
ing and capacity of these experts as well as weaknesses in
the way they were used in policy development.
The main contribution of the authors cited to the dis-
course in public policy lies in appreciating the leverage of
those in authority mostly the elected or the executive
within the public sector and their ability to sift out inputs
that are incongruent with their aspirations to arrive at pre-
ferred agenda and policy outcomes. They reiterate Dye’s
[12] idea of the political powerful where in democracies
such as the United States; public policy is made from the
top down, not from the bottom up. It is important to note
that all the authors subtly recognise the need for techni-
cians to learn the politics of reform but did not explore
the how. However, there is very limited analysis on the
cyclical reflection of other groups’ negotiation power in
arriving at outcomes. Between the various authors, the
multiple associations and networks which draw on differ-
ent levers of power resources based on discourse and
negotiations that influence policy are filtered out in favour
of power produced through class relations. Fundamentally,
the business of governance does not support this strict
dichotomy between politicians and technicians.
To assume that power in determining policy rests only
with the political elite and in a context of givers and takers
will need further interrogation if we are not to be caught
up in a single dimension framework. Gramci’s [13] idea of
counter-hegemonic manoeuvres drawing on multiple posi-
tions to influence the outcome of decisions such provides
anti-thesis. It brings in a dimension of social construct
that serves to legitimate other social structures in influen-
cing policy. Public policy is a result of on-going negotia-
tion between different actors who have almost an equal
influence on direction and outcome. These actors include
trade unions and political parties who gain concessions
using ‘manufacture consent’ and legitimacy [14].
Kingdon’s [15] multiple-streams theory also provides a
direction for multiple analyses beyond the power of the
elite. Here the process of public policy formulation is
randomly engaged where problems, policies and politics
interact in independent streams. The various streams
flow into each other as various constituents settle on
issues that provide common opportunities and agree-
ments. Here technical experts engage strongly sometimes
as a moral imperative, which sometimes may result in a
value conflict and should be seen as a sign of healthy
administrative practice.
Clearly there is considerable strength in looking at the
influence of the political elite in setting the policy agenda
and arriving at a specific policy outcome. Their actions of
preservation of interest to protect ideological positions
and retain control over the agenda and power resources
are significant in any analysis. However, to understand
the entire process and elements, it may be important not
to confine analysis to the political elite. The social con-
structs that recognise the influence of other players such
as civil society and the policy stream which include orga-
nisational, symbolic and scientific evidence has to be
equally considered. These various constituents and ele-
ments when woven together provide a complete nexus of
evidence on the key factors to be considered in the policy
formulation process. Based on appreciation of these var-
ious factors, it is possible for our purpose in this paper to
regroup the various elementsi n t of o u rt h e m a t i ca r e a s :
agenda setting, symbols manipulation, constituency pre-
servation and coalition building. We refer to these as the
policy levers drawn on by various actors to negotiate a
policy outcome. The levers are elaborated in figure 1
below. The paper uses these levers to explain the experi-
ence of Ghana in developing its National Health Insur-
ance policy, and draws lessons for actors preparing to
introduce major public policy reforms. The four theme
levers were adopted because they capture the most recur-
ring observations and lived experiences in the policy
development process as we saw it.
Methodology
This is a qualitative study based on participants’ observa-
tion. Participant observation was used to capture lived
experiences by the authors as a key member of the entire
process while observing the events unfold and having an
understanding of the decision making process. It helps to
answer questions on explanatory values of alternative
action. As noted by Agyepong and Adjei [5], “the in-
depth personal engagement of a participant observer
yields rich and ‘thick’ descriptive material and insights”
(p 153) but it is also its weakness. The participant’sv i e w
of the process may be clouded by their biases and senti-
ments and their influence on the processes may not be
objectively assessed. This is s u b s t a n t i a t e db yW a l ta n d
others [7] when they noted that “one of the issues facing
health policy analysts is how they are viewed or situated
as researchers” (p314). One cannot objectively observe
one’s self and how the participant’s behavior affected
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nions can also form a lens and filter out what is undesir-
able and incongruent with the personal beliefs, norms
and values. To minimize this level of bias, the authors
avoided were explicit where their judgment is inferred
and discussed issues to show how they were used to
arrive at outcomes. The author’s involvement with the
process of health insurance development in Ghana is
explained in endnote.
Factors leading to the establishment of health
insurance
Ghana’s 2010 population was estimated at 24.3 million.
Overall poverty rate had declined substantively over the
past two decades from 57.7% in 1991/92 to 28.5% in
2005/2006. The proportion of the population living
below the extreme poverty line also declined from 36.5%
to 18.2% over the same period. Ghana benefitted from
the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.
The health sector was allocated approximately 20% and
18% of poverty reduction related funds in 2007 and
2008 respectively. An important aspect of Ghana’s popu-
lation structure relates to ‘population momentum’.
Ghana’s dependency ratio currently is .72 dependents
per productive member. About 67% of the population is
in the informal sector.
The economy remains predominately agrarian though
it is suggested that the service sector may probably be
contributing more to GDP. From 2001 growth began to
accelerate and reached a high of 7.3% in 2007, which is
the second highest growth rate in the past three decades
after the 8.6% recorded in 1984. In the wake of the glo-
bal financial crisis and economic decline in 2007, the
real GDP growth rate declined to 4.7% in 2009. Value
Added Tax was introduced in 1998 and partial imple-
mentation of universal Tax Identification Numbers was
introduced in 1998. Price subsidies on agricultural
inputs were removed and independent utilities regula-
tory commission was established in 1998.
The current estimated life expectancy rate is 57 years;
Total Fertility Rate is 4.0 in 2008 compared with 4.4 in
2006. Use of modern contraceptive is about 17% in 2009.
The crude death rate is estimated at 8.93 deaths/1,000
population as of July 2010. Maternal mortality ratio
(MMR) between 1990 and 2007 had reduced from 740
per 100,000 live births to 451 per 100,000 live births [16].
At this rate, however, Ghana may not attain its MDG 5
target of 185 per 100,000 live births. It is estimated that
the MMR will be 340 per 100,000 in 2015. The Ghana
Demographic and Health Survey [17] showed a reduction
in the under-five mortality rate from 111 per 1000 live
births in 2003 to 80 per 1000 live births. Infant mortality
Figure 1 Four political levers of policy engagement
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in 2003 with neonatal mortality rate decreasing from 43
per 1000 live births in 2008. From the information, the
most significant contribution to under-five mortality is
deaths occurring within the first 28 days. Generally
Ghana is considered on course to attaining the child mal-
nutrition target under MDG 1 ahead of 2015. However,
according to the 2008 GDHS, 28% of Ghanaian children
were stunted, with 10% being severely stunted. The
extent of wasting has worsened within the last five years.
HIV prevalence among the adult population as at the end
of 2009 stood at 1.9%.
￿ Fee for service as a catalyst for health insurance
Health financing in Ghana at post-independence was
based on a “free” Health Services for All concept (tax-
based, non-earmarked), which guaranteed universal
access. In this regard, financial barrier to healthcare
access was avoided. The sustainability of this approach to
health financing was undermined by the persistent
decline of the economy in the late 1960s. The Health sec-
tor competed with other sectors, especially the priority
sectors for budgetary allocation from the consolidated
fund. Thus, it suffered from inadequate funding during
the period. This triggered the search for alternative or
complementary health financing [18].
T h eG h a n ah e a l t hi n s u r a n c ep o l i c ya g e n d ae m e r g e d
from different factors and sources. The first proposal for
a national health insurance scheme was made in 1970 as
part of a comprehensive plan to introduce cost recovery
and protect the poor. Though fee-for-service was intro-
duced in 1971 nothing was done for insurance. The Fee-
for-service (FFS) was implemented in a limited form as
token fees in the absence of a Legislative Instrument. It
was not until 1985 when the Legislative Instrument, LI
1313 was promulgated. Exemptions were granted for
selected public health diseases including leprosy and
yaws, hospital accommodation and antenatal and post-
natal care. No provision was made for the poor, indigent
and emergency care.
User fee became known in operation in Ghana as the
‘cash and carry’ system, reflecting its ‘supermarket
approach’ and resulted in a decline in service utilisation.
In the late 1990s, the attendant effects of FFS on utilisa-
tion became a source of concern for Government. The
per capita OPD attendance had consistently dropped
from 1.9 in 1970 to 0.3 in 2000. A study in 1999 [19]
found that 84% of patients eligible for exemptions were
not exempted. Another review [20] also noted that there
was no clear guidance on how to identify the various per-
sons to be exempted. In particular knowledge about how
exemptions should be applied varied widely among var-
ious providers. Other difficulties included whether the
exemption of a disease also included the exemption of
the administrative cost associated with it before diagnosis
and what happens when a condition manifest as a com-
plication of other ailments.
Just about 44% of those who were ill had consulted a
medical practitioner mainly because of the barriers that
fee for service presents [21] at the time. Between 1995 and
2003 clinical attendance has fallen by 25% while the aver-
age revenue had increased. The drive for more revenue
also led to over prescription of drugs beyond the accepta-
ble prescription protocol for ailments such as malaria [22]
and; rates being quoted as claims for reimbursement for
drugs used varied widely for the same conditions and ill-
nesses between facilities and regions [23]. This occurred
because of the absence of a standard and reliable price list
for conditions and commodities. As a result it was difficult
to properly track the accuracy of what was being claimed.
The general average reimbursement rate in 2003 and 2004
was 49% and 69% respectively.
￿ Experience from early attempts at social health
insurance
Between 1989 and 1993 the Catholic Diocese of Sunyani
initiated a health facility-based health insurance at
St Theresa’s Hospital, Nkoranza in response to the nega-
tive effects of the FFS on service utilization. The decision
to undertake this venture was inspired by the example of
Bwamanda Hospital Health Insurance Scheme in the
former Zaire and spearheaded by Dr. Ineke Bossman,
then Administrator and District Medical Officer of
Health (DMOH) in charge of Nkoranza at the time [24].
Although the Nkoranza scheme achieved significant
enrollment of membership, it had its shortfalls among
which were exclusion of the poorest of the poor, absence
of community ownership and a precarious financial posi-
tion to ensure sustainability.
The challenges notwithstanding, the Nkoranza experi-
ence inspired other initiatives. The Society of Private
Medical Practitioners, Ghana in 1993 also established
the first private mutual health insurance; Nationwide
Mutual Medical Insurance Scheme in the country. By
1998 the scheme had collapsed as a result of delayed
reimbursement due to manual processing leading to
under-servicing on clients by providers, fraudulent
claims and inadequate premium. New district schemes
also emerged sponsored by some development partners
at Damango, Drobo, Duayaw Nkwanta, Berekum and
Dangme West districts. There was also no legal frame-
work to regulate the business. However, the community
having experienced the benefit of an insurance type pre-
payment arrangement were willing to sustain social
insurance type mechanisms to finance their health care.
Asenso-Okyere and others [25] had examined the will-
ingness to pay for health insurance using Contingent
Valuation Methods. The studies concluded that pre-pay-
ment schemes could curtail self-medication and delays
in seeking care. There was a high degree of acceptance
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premium of about US$3.03 per month.
Milestones in establishing the scheme
T h eM i n i s t r yo fH e a l t h ,i n1 9 9 7 ,u n d e rt h eN a t i o n a l
Democratic Congress led government established a task
force and a Directorate for Health Insurance with the
responsibility to facilitate the National Health Insurance
Scheme. Preparatory efforts were made by commission-
ing an actuarial study and the Ghana Health Company,
a subsidiary of SSNIT, established to initiate a health
insurance scheme for the formal sector. It further went
ahead to create a regional secretariat in Koforidua,
Eastern Region. However, not much was done in actua-
lising the dream at the time of handing over to the New
Patriotic Party (NPP) led Government in 2001. The
Division was abolished and the company was liquidated.
The regional secretariat however remained but with no
clear responsibilities.
The NPP manifesto gave an indication of abolishing
“Cash and Carry” and replaced by a national health
insurance scheme when elected into office in 2001. This
was actualised by linking it to the main policy strategy
of Government to reduce poverty contained in the
Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy I document and the
Health Goal of Health for All. Thus, the focus was to
ensure that the poor and vulnerable in society have
access to healthcare. A Multi-Agency Technical Com-
mittee led by the Ministry of Health was set-up in 2001
comprising key stakeholders to formulate a policy and
design the structure and form of the National Health
Insurance Scheme. In drafting the policy, the committee
had to conduct a critical analysis of eight (8) alternative
scheme designs including the Kenyan and Tanzanian
models and finally selected the decentralised approach;
the District Mutual Health Insurance approach which
was a cross between the Dangbe West District and
Atiwa model. Whilst working at the policy, the Ministry
initiated a pilot of the design at Ejisu-Juaben District in
Ashanti region and subsequently at Kpeshie in the
Greater Accra region. The idea was to test how the
design will play out in both rural and urban settings.
Being satisfied with the initial outcome, the Ministry
decided to increase the number of schemes from about
10 to 45 so as to get a regional spread and learning
experience in establishing the systems without access to
benefits as yet. This was before the final policy was
completed and the law passed. There was political com-
mitment and clarity of direction from the political lea-
dership and; funds were available from the Highly
Indebted Poor Countries relief fund. Health insurance
was one of the performance measures signed into the
Minister of Health’s letter of appointment by the Presi-
dent. But there were also detractions from those who
preferred a civil service approach of policy approval
before action. This led to a number of fall outs within
the committee with some members walking out and
others considering the movers as traitors or ruling gov-
ernment sympathisers. The motivation however was
simply to get things rolling before the enthusiasm gets
paralysed by excessive analysis and technical detail. On
hind sight, this proved to be a good approach as the
rancour that accompanied the policy and legal develop-
ment process discussed later in this paper will have
truncated the entire exercise.
By January, 2002, a draft policy had been formulated
which was put before stakeholders across the country
grouped in four zones and a national forum. Subse-
quently, there were presentations made to specific stake-
holder group, such as the Ghana Employers Association,
the National House of Chiefs and the Trade Union Con-
gress. The final draft was tabled by the Minister of
Health at cabinet in May, 2002. Apart from the scheme
design, the policy proposed various sources of funding
of the scheme including the use of SSNIT contributions
and VAT. The policy focus was to achieve redistribution
of wealth through cross-subsidisation and risk-equalisa-
tion and therefore, the strategy was to make the scheme
universal for both the formal and informal sectors to
make contributions. The technical committee made two
presentations at cabinet. After the first presentation, a
sub-committee of cabinet was constituted to carry out
further analysis. The cabinet sub-committee requested
the technical committee to provide it with detailed
financial analysis to assist it in arriving at a decision.
It took cabinet about six month to decide on the
financing model. The policy was approved in December,
2002 and an announcement was made through the 2003
budget submission to create a health fund for the health
insurance scheme with a National Health Insurance
Levy of 2.5% on consumption goods and hiving off 2.5%
of the 17.5% contributions to the SSNIT fund represent-
ing contributions of the formal sector workers. The
technical committee made a presentation on the draft
bill to the Joint Parliamentary select committees on
Health and Subsidiary Legislation. Ghana’sN a t i o n a l
Health Insurance Scheme was finally introduced in 2004
following the passage of the Act of Parliament, Act 650
of 2003 and Legislative Instrument 1809, 2004. . In 2005
the technical committee moved quickly to expand cov-
erage to 125 districts to undertake preparatory activities
to establish full blown district mutual health insurance
schemes as soon the Act became operative.
Political levers influencing policy and design
￿ Agenda setting
Publications in relation to failed fee-for-service policy
implementation and experience with social health
Seddoh and Akor BMC Public Health 2012, 12(Suppl 1):S10
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/S1/S10
Page 6 of 11insurance schemes provided good material to convince
those who were evidence inclined. These were translated
into policy briefs and flyers in simple language to bring
attention and catalyse discussion among key stake-
holders. There was a deliberate and systematic effort by
the Committee members to engage think tanks and civil
society organisations such as the Institute of Economic
Affairs, the Ghana Medical Association and academic
institutions to interrogate and debate the merits of an
insurance scheme. The Health Partners Summit held
twice in a year also became a convenient platform for
keeping the agenda on the table. Between 1999 and
2002 the effect of user fees and health insurance fea-
tured on every health summit and was captured in the
aid memoire of four of the summits as the preferred
policy.
However, to get the health insurance to become a
national agenda required more than academic evidence
and aide memoirs. It had to be translated into the reali-
ties of the population lived experiences to which the poli-
tical decision makers and legislators can relate. The
technical experts turned to the media for support.
Primarily, civil servants started exposing the media to the
challenges of the sector. One of the reported issues
within clinical practice was what became known as ‘med-
ical prisoners’. These were in-patients who have been
cured of their ailment but are being detained by health
facilities until their debts were redeemed by relatives or
philanthropists. The uncomfortable effect of these publi-
cations led to politicians asking questions about what
could be done to resolve the issues.
As ministers turn to technical experts for advice, they
pointed to health insurance as a way out and ‘sneaked’
them into speeches of ministers as an issue on the table
to ameliorate the situation and held several discussions
on radio and television. However, the debate on what
form insurance should take was not without its own
complications. The debates at the various forums and in
the media sometimes polarised the issues along political
lines and the facts got misrepresented particularly when
non-technical persons within the media attempted to
translate technical words into vernacular or local dialects.
Some of the words simply could not be translated. For
instance, it was difficult to precisely translate premium
into a single word. Attempts to use imagery and figura-
tive sentences sometimes complicated understanding and
lent it to manipulation. There were also so many interests
and complications to be negotiated of which constituency
preservation was key.
￿ Constituency preservation
The pluralism of pilot models caused public opinion
on the models proposed by the National Democratic
Congress (NDC) to be so diverse that major political
parties started issuing statements on the implementation
of the scheme in order to preserve their constituencies.
Each political party defined what their positions were
while attacking the position of the other.
The major political parties engaged in a battle of the
hearts and minds of the electorate. Each party attempted
to represent itself as having something distinct from the
other but not always with clarity. It however did not
matter in so long as a certain noise was generated
which attacked the other parties positions as unaccepta-
ble propositions. It was not clear what the National
D e m o c r a t i cC o n g r e s s( N D C )g o v e r n m e n tt h a ts t a r t e d
the current phase proposal’s position was and it is still
very difficult to date to articulate what its policy is on
health insurance. The NDC had no written document
on their position on health financing and this made it
difficult for its constituencies to align with a single
vision. Its position was generally a cross between indivi-
dual responsibility for health but without alienating itself
from the core principles of social democracy. Providing
government subvention in health financing was seen as
providing that opportunity.
The lack of clarity in its position on the matter made
it difficult for its followers and members of parliament
to defend the party agenda on insurance and decimated
its constituency. One of its deputy Ministers of Health
in 2000 argued that a single national system as was
being piloted was not feasibly and called for district
schemes. This did not sit well with his colleagues in par-
liament. He was accused of selling out and forced to
reword his presentation during questioning in parlia-
ment on the issue. The lack of focus led to the intro-
duction of multiple pilot schemes with none being given
priority attention for replication.
The New Patriotic Party (NPP) in their medium term
priorities made clear its intent to phase out the cash and
carry system and replace it with a more humane and
effective system of financing health care. The party on
assuming power in 2001 quickly sent out a clear sign of
government intent on introducing insurance. As noted
earlier one of the key performance measures in the letter
appointing the Minister of Health to the position in
October 2001 was the introduction of social health insur-
ance. On December 19 2001, the Minister of Health
announced the processes for drafting of a bill that would
regulate the health insurance industry, create a national
insurance fund and provide procedures for resolving con-
flicts. This allowed its followers to comment on issues
being discussed by the public even if sometimes their
arguments were incoherent. What clarity did for them
w a st h a tt h e yw e r ea b l et or a l l ys u p p o r ta m o n gp a r t y
faithful, gave the voice to participate in debates and pre-
serve their constituencies.
When government position is not clear, technical
experts turn to preserve their own constituencies by
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lukewarm manner usually resulting in the failure of the
policy. The relative clarity on the part of the NPP and
its commitment to achieve the introduction of health
insurance gave technical experts within the Ministry of
Health a direction on what the government policy was
without compromising the position of Ministry of
Health officials as pursing a non-technical agenda. In
our opinion, it is this lack of clarity on the part of the
National Democratic Congress when it started its own
schemes that contributed to its inertia.
￿ Symbols manipulation
Symbols have long been known to be manipulated to
both positive and negative by various actors. This is
because words and statements presented are not always
ubiquitous in meaning particularly if they are ambiguous
and can be reinterpreted and re-presented.
The policy paper submitted to cabinet contained a pro-
posed design of health insurance and the possible finan-
cing sources. Three scenarios were presented for
financing. The first was to raise funds based entirely on
premiums as derived from the ILO actuarial analysis.
This will have meant a minimum of the equivalent of US
$360 per annum for each citizen if the entire population
was to be covered for a suggested benefit package mainly
outpatient services and referred cases. The second was to
draw funds from three sources: government budget, pay-
roll deductions of 15% from formal health workers and
an additional contribution of the equivalent US$120 from
the entire population irrespective of employment status
per annum. The third is to drop the contributions
entirely, replace payroll deduction with allocations from
t h eS o c i a lS e c u r i t ya n dN a t i o n a lI n s u r a n c eT r u s tf u n d ,
source funds from government budget and raise the per-
centage on the ad-valorem tax (VAT) by about 3.5% and
allocate that to the insurance fund.
The first two were rejected on grounds that at a per
capita income of US$360 at the time and the level pov-
erty these were not feasible propositions. On the third,
the reaction from cabinet was that using ad valorem tax
(VAT) though attractive posed its own political pro-
blems. VAT as a symbol will easily be manipulated by the
opposition. The National Democratic Congress intro-
duced VAT in 1998 when the NPP was in opposition.
The NPP described the tax as regressive, in-human and
insensitive to the plight of Ghanaians. Following very
heated debates and heckling in parliament and casualties
resulting from a demonstration dubbed ‘kumi preko’
meaning ‘better kill me now’ insinuating that it is better
t od i et h a nl i v eu n d e raV A Tr e g i m e ,t h eN P Pt h e ni n
opposition parliamentarians walked out of the proceed-
ings and refused to vote on the issue.
The NDC passed VAT into law because they formed
the majority in parliament then. To mention an increase
in VAT by any figure will be playing right into the
hands of the NDC now in opposition. After a lengthy
debate, it was agreed to call it a National Health Insur-
ance Levy (NHIL). At Akosombo in 2003 where the Par-
liamentary Sub-committee on Health met to deliberate
on the matter, there appeared to be bi-partisan consen-
sus. When the policy was tabled in parliament under
the draft bill, the NDC were quick to latch on the NPP
‘double standard’ and decried a tax increase that will
translate into higher prices on goods and services. It
argued that a tax that is collected by the VAT agency,
on the same qualifying goods and services and adminis-
tered under the same tax regime can be nothing but an
increase in VAT.
The debates on the floor of parliament were uncom-
promisingly polarised, technically deficient and focused
on government insincerity at opposing a previous policy
on which it is building its fortunes. The images and
accounts of mass demonstrations led by the NPP, the
loss of lives, the embarrassment of withdrawing an ear-
lier VAT bill in 1995 and reintroducing it three years
later with a much lower rate and loss of revenue were
too strong to ignore. The NDC recounted these vividly
on the floor of the debate and raised strong sentiments
among its sympathisers against the proposal.
Academicians joined in the debate and put out the
mathematics to show that the increase of 2.5% is actually
an increase of 20% in the tax regime. The production sec-
tor protested that the new levy will increase production
cost and make them uncompetitive against imported fin-
ished products. The general population weighed in through
mass media but the president and his constituents were
resolute in their resolve. In almost a payback faction, the
NDC walked out of parliament when it came to vote on
the issue. The NPP being in majority voted to pass the bill.
￿ Coalition building
Enrolment and membership in a District Mutual
Health Insurance Scheme is mandatory for all residents
of Ghana except those working with the Ghana Armed
F o r c e s ,t h eG h a n aP o l i c eS e r v i c eo rt h o s ew h oh a v e
proof of holding a health insurance policy. Persons eligi-
ble to membership are expected to pay a contribution of
GHC 7.2 per year equivalent of US$ 7.74 at time of pas-
sage of Act.
While the debate on VAT or not VAT was on going,
labour took issue with the 2.5% of the Social Security
and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) to be appro-
priated to the insurance fund. Labour had earlier in
2002 agreed to the 2.5% as a matter of principle.
Because the Trade Union Congress (TUC) representa-
tive served on the Ministerial Committee it was
assumed TUC endorsed the proposal.
First, the TUC opined that as a matter of principle
they had agreed to having a scheme that benefitted their
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policy. SSNIT money was workers money was the tune.
Government should have in their opinion come back to
the table to negotiate the details and not spring it out
on them in a proposed law. Secondly, they put forward
a crude calculation. Taking 2.5% from the SSNIT fund
will actually amount to 14.7% of the SSNIT fund. The
total amount also meant that each worker was contri-
buting an approximate 3.6 Ghana cedis, an equivalent of
US$ 3.87 in 2003. Workers considered that this was
unfair and it will affect their pension benefits. The TUC
decided to call on its membership to reject the proposal.
Fighting a two front war was never a good idea. The
government chose to build coalitions through careful
compromises. The NPP with advice from the technical
experts within the Ministry of Health did three things.
( i )I to f f e r e dL a b o u rg u a r a n t e e st h a tg o v e r n m e n tw a s
only borrowing the money and that no part of the funds
appropriate will be transferred or accounted against any
worker’s end of service benefit. (ii) All contributors to
SSNIT and their dependants as well as all pensioners on
SSNIT benefit will not have to pay premiums to be
registered on the scheme. In effect, labour and for that
matter the formal sector will have free health care in
Ghana. (iii) Since formal sector labour has put up calcu-
lations on how much the 2.5% will be in terms of indivi-
dual obligations, the informal sector will have to make
up an equivalent in premiums. However, each informal
sector contributor will have to carry one child so that
all other dependants may benefit. Above 70 year olds
were to be entirely exempted to be consistent with end
of pension calculation for surviving pensioners which
was pegged at 72 years. It was these negotiations that
led to the setting of the premium at 7.2 Ghana cedis per
annum or US$ 7.74.
Once these compromises were negotiated, a coalition
was built between government and labour that led labour
to tone down and not engage with the VAT issues. It was
possible that without this coalition building government
could not have passed the bill. Here, labour as civil
society, proved more powerful an ally to have than to
compromise with opposition political parties in parlia-
ment. Technically, it should be admitted that a better
engagement process should have been developed with
the key stakeholders by the technical experts to amelio-
rate some of these issues coming up late in the process.
Discussions
Initiating a policy change requires thorough understand-
ing of the context and careful management of the pro-
cess. During the introduction of health insurance,
politicians, technical experts, the media and scientific
evidence played significant roles in setting the health
insurance agenda. Politicians needed to understand the
political gains and technical implications. These are
then crystallize and re-positioned by them in the per-
ceptive mind of the populace in such a way that gave
them leverage with the electorate.
Various stakeholders had the opportunity to interact
on common platforms and to express their views. In
what resembles Dye’sb u r s t so fi d e a sg a i n i n gc r e d e n c e
over time think tanks such as the Institute of Economic
Affairs (IEA) become a place of vibrant ideas that
shifted depending on the audience. The institute suf-
fered a few embarrassments in the process. For instance,
the institute held a forum in June 2002 to discuss the
‘proposed Health Insurance Bill’ only to be told by the
Deputy Minister of Health there was nothing so called.
Yet, there had been several ministerial and government
statements indicating that a bill had been drafted and
under discussion. What the IEA tabled was actually a
leaked draft which contained some of the difficult pro-
posals that resulted in the polarisations discussed. With-
out adequate information and transparency on how the
agenda is discussed and moved into policy and imple-
mentation, sometimes the entire enterprise can be
viewed as conspiracy at work. This probably is what
accounted for the political powerful that Agyepong and
Adjei [5] observed in their article.
Constituency preservation proved to be important par-
ticularly for political parties when the agenda has
already gained currency among the population. The way
t h ei s s u ei sc a p t u r e di nt h e ir manifestos ultimately
determines the acceptance of the proposition among
their own constituents. Fundamentally, it became clear
to us that political parties found it necessary to preserve
who they are in order that their identity may be pre-
served against the elegy of foreign ideology. Clarity and
clear messaging is important if the preferred option is to
be supported by technical experts for implementation.
This is what defined the difference between the success
of the NDC who started insurance but without a clear
orientation and ideology and the NPP who tied their
political fortunes to the introduction of health insur-
ance. To gain support for policy, the direction must be
clear and uniquely defined as a product so that technical
experts, civil society and the general public may engage
without feeling politically drawn in.
Constituency preservation could also be through omis-
sion and it needs to be watched out. There was almost a
general silence on the part of external partners as
between 2000 and 2004. DANIDA was the only active
partner in establishing community schemes and is cred-
ited with establishing some 34 community schemes.
Though USAID commissioned reports into understand-
ing factors contributing to sustainable management of
community scheme, it did not actively express a position
as an agency. The International Labour Organisation
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under the NDC.
As a collective body during the Health Summits, the
development partners only advocated caution towards
migrating too quickly to a national social health insur-
ance scheme. Between 2001 and 2002 the aide memoirs
signed show that health partners offered a very mea-
sured support for a community based insurance scheme
with national oversight. In 2003 the partners requested
that the bill be withdrawn because they disagreed with
the design. Their preference was for community
schemes. The Technical Committee rejected the request
and partners threatened to march on parliament. After
several discussions, it became clear that the differences
were more of a misunderstanding in design and misin-
formation in the financing framework. The partners
however refused to fund the scheme establishment
directly.
One year after its passage, the World Bank Country
Assessment Strategy (CAS) broke ranks and promised
that the bank will provide a policy note that will aim to
help the government to develop an implementation
strategy for the recently-approved National Health
Insurance Act, to ensure its fiscal sustainability and pov-
erty impact. Because of their non-engagement from the
start, the World Banks’ project to support the imple-
mentation of the scheme has failed. The Aide Memoire
“Republic of Ghana Implementation Support Mission
for Health Insurance Project (Credit-P101852) Decem-
ber 1 to 10, 2010” submitted by the Bank to government
expressed disappoint in the lack of interest of govern-
ment in external support for health insurance.
Clarity creates symbols and symbols define the consti-
tuent’s preferences. With high levels of clarity, the posi-
tion of the dominant sponsoring organisation becomes
linked more precisely with the policy proposal. It then
becomes easy for opposing forces to engage through
symbols manipulation. This is why VAT generated so
much heat. However, the ambiguities and veneering of
the same as representing something else also did not
help. Although it will be hypothesis at this stage to say
that coming clean that the 2.5% is actually an increase
in VAT could have helped, it was still deceptive and
surely did not help matters. It required too much energy
on the part of the technical experts to try and find com-
promises through parliamentary lobbying. We should
also admit that we did not have expertise in backroom
lobbying and learnt it in the process. Being aware of the
political environment is also very important. There were
times when our recommendations have not been taken
seriously, or have been set aside, because the political
timing was not right or the evidence we brought up
came at an inopportune time in terms of the politics
around the evidence.
During coalition building, the government was forced
to make several tactical concessions to build a winning
coalition. The opposition were very focused on the sin-
gle issue of VAT and constituency preservation that
they did not engage fully with the entire proposition.
Civil Society Organisations such as the Trade Union
C o n g r e s s( T U C )p r o v e dt e c h n i c a l l yi n e f f i c i e n ta tr e p r e -
senting their constituencies or the interest of the popu-
lation. Given their capacity constraints in what health
insurance actually meant under the proposed design
they did not invest the effort needed to understand the
policy issues. In several instances, they wanted to act on
their own, remained in an unhelpful mode of ‘opposi-
tion’ to government and resist rather than engage with
the policy processes. Although such contestation is justi-
fied in some instances, overall TUC lost the opening
provided them to respond to the new opportunities that
have arisen. It was therefore much easier for govern-
ment to buy them out with concessions that directly
appealed to their unionised members’ immediate inter-
est while masking the actuarial mathematics of the out-
come on return on investment of opportunities forgone.
In the process, TUC failed to look at the big picture as
representing all labour both SSNIT and non-SSNIT con-
tributors such as the informal sector which contributed
significantly to the Gross Domestic Product of the coun-
try. The NDC, the party in opposition attempted to call
attention to this but did not have effective machinery in
place to sell this interest. In our opinion, what was com-
promised was the general interest of the larger informal
sector that had no organised voice at the table.
Conclusion
The poor are still paying and the gainfully employed
have free care. This is the dilemma of the realised policy
and national health insurance in Ghana. Parliament no
longer acted as the representative government protect-
ing the interest of the people. It was polarised and
caught up in party politics. Constituency preservation
became more important than focus on the agenda and
its benefits. Though the media attempted to articulate
the issues, once the debate was on in parliament, it
spent time on reporting routine government speeches,
political party responses and was caught up in the sen-
sationalism surrounding thef e u d so ni n s u r a n c el e v y
through VAT and SSNIT appropriations. The alternate
explanation is that health insurance was a new ground
and the media had little technical knowledge to analyse
and report effectively. This capacity in the media needs
to be build for new reforms that require new technical
terminologies and design.
From the Ghana experience, evidence for policy is as
essential as the political leverages used to interpret and
a r r i v ea td e s i r e do u t p u t s .I ti ss o m e t i m e sb e t t e rt o
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the contextual factors and the epistemologies of the sta-
keholders rather than the stakeholders themselves.
There are no straight and determined pathways for
achieving outcomes so appreciating the evidence and
basis for design, negotiation process and building coali-
tions along the way are skills to be mastered. Using the
four-way policy and political leverages framework can
help in the process. This framework is not meant to be
used as an alternative to but as complementary to exist-
ing frameworks so an appreciation and deeper under-
standing of the subtle leverages is formed as part of
policy formulation. In applying the framework, new per-
spectives have been brought to the introduction of
health insurance as a policy in Ghana. We believe that
this framework with others should bring a more
balanced understanding to some of the policy and politi-
cal leverages that come to play in introducing a major
reform such as health insurance in the public sector.
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